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pending between Peru and Chile.*

*An article which appeared in "La
Reforma Social" by Dr. I. Alzamora,
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PERU A WILD COUNTRY

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The present difficulties between Peru and Chile originated with the war which Chile undertook against Bolivia and Peru early in 1879, and which ended, in favor of Chile, on the 20th of October, 1883. The cause of this war is an indispensable factor, so that the importance of the present difficulties and the influence which they may have in the future, may be properly appreciated.

The apparent and immediate cause of the war of 1879 was a claim against the Bolivian Government, made by that of Chile, on account of a tax of ten *"centavos" which the former country had decreed should be levied on each hundredweight of nitrate, which a mining company, financed by Chilean capital, extracted from Bolivian territory. Bolivia eventually desisted from the collection of this tax, but this did not prevent Chile from carrying out its intention of obtaining possession of the territory which contained the mineral worked by the company already referred to; and as Bolivia had concluded a treaty of alliance and defence—not offence—with Peru, Chile declared war on Peru also,

Putting aside the trivial and irrational pretext put forward by Chile, the very cause for which was withdrawn by Bolivia, the real motive of the war was the incalculable wealth in nitrate and guano which the Atacama Desert contained, the northern and richest portion of which belonged to Peru, while that in the south belonged to Bolivia. This is the reason why this war between Peru and Chile (for Bolivia is scarcely mentioned) has been generally designated by the world as the "Nitrate War." The following facts prove that the estimation of the world was far from wrong, and that the entire responsibility for the war rests with Chile.

Before the war, Chile possessed no nitrate bearing lands; since the war Chile has become sole owner of all the nitrate territory on the West Coast of South America, which formerly was the recognized and undisputed property of Peru and Bolivia.

Before the war Chile was the poorest State of South America, with a yearly budget of barely 12 million "pesos," which made a war undertaken against such a country the worst possible bar-

*About five cents American currency.

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gain for Peru, which, with its wealth in nitrate and guano, and with the additional lustre of having been the seat of Spanish colonial government, was coveted by and excited the greed and envy of its neighbor. Since the war Chile, in proportion to its population and the extent of its territory, has become the richest State of the Continent, with a budget of over 200 million "pesos."

When the war broke out Chile, notwithstanding the straitened condition of her finances, had been able to obtain the required supremacy on sea necessary to overwhelm the naval units of Peru, which country had been, until shortly before, the dominating sea power on the coast of South America; this naturally assured the victory for Chile, as the sea was, practically, the only means the two countries had for communicating with the outside world and between one another.

On the independence of the South American Republics from Spain, Peru and Chile were not bordering countries, because the new State of Bolivia, brought into existence south, and at the territorial expense of Peru, separated them for the whole of the distance where their frontiers were liable to meet. For this reason, any difficulty which Chile might wish to originate was bound to begin with Bolivia, although the coveted prize lay in Peru. Besides, Bolivia, shut in by her mountains, and exercising no efficacious supervision over her coast nor over the rich desert which separated her from it; weakened by anarchy, and governed by a succession of semi-civilized and venal military tyrants, lent herself admirably to the designs of Chile.

From the dealings of these unfortunate Bolivian despots with the subtle officials of the astute Chilean diplomacy, a dispute arose in 1842, the year when the riches of Atacama were discovered, but of which Chile must doubtless have been cognizant beforehand, the reason for which could not be explained on the continent.

Up to 1842 the Republic of Chile, and before it the Captaincy General of the same name, had always observed as its northernmost boundary, indisputable from its very nature, the Desert of Atacama, which begins at the 27th degree of Latitude South. All public or private documents bearing on the subject dating from colonial times, attest the fact, and the same is true of all documents of the republic, previous to 1842, and specifically with regard to the several Constitutions which Chile herself had approved up to then, in which the northern boundary of the Republic is declared to be the Desert of Atacama.

But in that same year of 1842, Chilean vessels began clandestinely loading guano, which had recently been discovered on the

coast of Bolivia. This originated the adoption of certain measures and presentation of claims on the part of the Bolivian Government, which were entirely successful and acquiesced in by Chile, whose Government, in the case of the vessel "Janequeo," gave ample satisfaction to the Government of Bolivia. But when the agents of this Government seized a party of adventurers who were extracting guano near the port of Mejillones, the Chilean man-o'-war, "El Chile," came to the assistance of the prisoners, set them at liberty, landed an armed force, and, erecting a small fort, raised the Chilean flag thereon. Dr. E. S. Zeballos, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States Government at Washington, referring to this action, in his work on international law, says: "This is the manner in which Chile first appeared in Atacama, north of the river Paposo." (The Paposo flows into the Pacific Ocean on parallel 25.)

Following this serious and unprovoked aggression, and notwithstanding Bolivian representations, Chilean incursions in the desert continued; and President Montt informed the Chilean Congress that a Commission, appointed by him to explore the coast from Coquimbo to Mejillones (all of which is Bolivian territory) for the purpose of discovering whether guano deposits could be found *in the territory of the Chilean Republic*, which, properly worked (the collection of guano requires no working) could be made to yield a new source of income for the national exchequer; and that, although the result of the expedition had not, as yet, fulfilled his expectations, guano had been found from Degree 29.35' to Degree 25.6' Latitude South. Acting upon this information, the Chilean Congress approved the law of the 31st of October, 1842, which decreed that "* * * all guano deposits existing *in the Province of Coquimbo, on the coast of Atacama* and adjacent islands, are declared to be national property (Chilian)." The Bolivian Minister immediately demanded from the Chilean Government the annulment by Congress of the law of the 31st of October, but the demand was denied by the Chilean Foreign Office, which alleged, with a show of surprise, that, whatever the opinion entertained by the Government, in view of the reasons and principles adduced, the altering of existing laws could not be counted among its attributions.

By means of these artful devices, the first frontier contention between Chile and Bolivia was at last officially initiated, but the expostulations of the latter country, devoid of military support, obtained no satisfaction and were continually postponed on the

slightest pretext, until finally, the true value of the desert having been discovered by the Chilian Government, the man-o'-war "Esmeralda" entered the port of Mejillones on the 20th of August, 1857, and expelled by force the Bolivian authorities. To the further representations which this act of spoliation gave rise, Chile replied proposing a division of the desert and negotiations for a delimitation of frontiers; and Bolivia, weary at last, having lost all hope, dismembered and still worse governed, committed the incredible folly of accepting this proposal in substance, and from that moment became involved in a maze of negotiations and treaties, each one of which, instead of solving the difficulty which it occasioned, created others and still further complicated the situation; matters culminating at last in the war and the total loss to Bolivia of all its coast and the entire Desert of Atacama. Referring to these treaties, the eminent Chilian writer, Marcial Martinez, in his work entitled "Chile and Bolivia," states that his countrymen could not have adopted other means if they had been operating in an uncivilized country. To this period belongs the formation in Bolivia of the Chilian propagandist society "The Fatherland," which pursued the same ends, and followed the same procedure as did the German propagandist organizations in this country and in Europe more recently.

The first boundary treaty between Chile and Bolivia was that of the 10th of August, 1866, which Chilian diplomacy was able to wrest from Bolivia, due to two very exceptional circumstances: The war which Spain was waging against Peru, in the first instance, and later against Chile, and which awakened sentimental unity for common defence in all the western republics of South America, with the exception of Chile; and secondly, the dictatorship in Bolivia of General Melgarejo, the most unfortunate of all the Bolivian tyrants of that unhappy period. In this treaty of 1866, clause IV states that "* * * All the products of the territory comprised between Degrees 24 and 25, exported through the port of Mejillones, shall be exempt from duty." This clause, which remained implicitly subsistent in the later treaty of 1874, contains the germ of the dispute which caused the conflagration.

With the ostensible purpose of securing the adhesion of Bolivia to the alliance which Peru and Chile had celebrated in defence against Spain, the Chilian Government sent a very important mission to Bolivia; which, besides obtaining the entrance of Bolivia in the alliance against Spain, of no real interest to Bolivia, since that country lacked the units which could be opposed to the Spanish vessels, produced the following practical results: 1st. Chile

negotiated her first boundary treaty; the only legal grounds for all the other rights which she has later alleged to possess over the desert of Atacama; second, the establishment of a community of territories, customs houses and product of the mines, admirably suited to become later the hatchery for all manner of difficulties and litigation; third, the conferring on the Dictator Melgarejo by the Chilian Government of the highest honors, including the title of general in the Chilian army, and fourth, that Melgarejo, all the foregoing notwithstanding, should leave on record for posterity his honorable attitude, for he firmly and finally declined the reiterated proposals of the Chilian Plenipotentiary to enter into an alliance against Peru (at the time an ally of both parties) the terms of which were the cession by Bolivia of all her coast with the Atacama Desert, and taking in exchange the Peruvian coast and the Desert of Tarapaca, up to and including the port of Arica. Chile was to give Melgarejo all the necessary means for conquering Peru and even an aide de camp, in the person of the distinguished Chilian statesman, Carlos Walker Martinez, at the time secretary to the Chilian Legation at La Paz, who was to accompany the Bolivian dictator in his glorious undertaking, and had obtained, for the purpose, his appointment as major in the Bolivian army. All this is contained in a communication, dated the 21st of April, 1879, addressed to the Bolivian plenipotentiary at Lima by Mariano D. Muñoz, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Bolivia, and is mentioned in the work "The Question of the Pacific," by Dr. Victor M. Maurtua, translated, and added to by Mr. F. A. Pezet, of which volume the present article is a brief summary.


While these patent facts were being enacted, the fatuous dictator, deceived by the adulation lavished upon him in Chile, allowed the most far-reaching, unnecessary and absurd concessions to be obtained from him by the "Compañía de Salitre y Ferrocarril de Antofagasta" (Antofagasta Saltpetre and Railway Company) a company financed by powerful Chilian capitalists and backed by the public men and the Government of Chile; to such an extent that the whole desert of Atacama, with all its wealth, practically became the property of this company without the slightest compensation. When at last Bolivia was rid of Melgarejo, the new Government endeavored to at least reduce, since it was impossible to annul (which would have been, however, justifiable under the circumstances) the illegal and unheard-of grants made by the former dictator. This gave rise to a series of claims by the company; of diplomatic representations, of

threats and oppressive measures on the part of Chile, to which the Bolivian Government put an end through an agreement by which Bolivia allowed the company the enjoyment of all the concessions to which it laid claim, while the company agreed to give the Bolivian Government 10 per cent of its profits; but the Bolivian Congress, aware that this co-partnership in the proceeds would inevitably become a new source of complications and abuses, substituted for it a fixed tax of ten "centavos" per hundredweight of exported nitrate in lieu of the 10 per cent on the profits.

Although the above related to an agreement between the Bolivian Government and the Company, and that the latter had not complained of the modification in the agreement made by Congress, the Chilean Government protested against the arrangement, in a most intemperately worded note, dated the 2nd of July, 1878, pretexting the contents of clause IV of the boundary treaty of 1874, by which any increase in taxation on Chilean persons, industries and capital was forbidden; subsequently the Chilean Government threatened that of Bolivia with the rupture of this same treaty, not, indeed, with the object of restoring to Bolivia all that this treaty, and that of 1866, had gratuitously given Chile, but with the intention of acquiring still more; that is to say, of excluding Bolivia from all authority in the Atacama Desert, as though this territory had originally belonged to Chile and not to Bolivia; entirely overlooking, in addition, the arbitration clause which the treaty contains, which was peculiarly applicable in the present circumstance; and making use, moreover, of the most vexatious threats and means so as to effectively close the door to any peaceable solution of the question. Confronted by such a grave situation, and wanting in every means of defence, Bolivia consented to annul the law relating to the ten centavo tax, on condition that the Chilean Government withdraw its insulting and threatening note, a condition which Chile refused to consider.

The company thereupon declared its unwillingness to accept the substitution of the export tax for the 10 per cent of the profits arrangement, so the Bolivian Government consented to repeal the law. This might have been expected to obviate all difficulties and bring matters back again to the condition in which they were before the agreement was entered into, but the Chilean Government preferred not to take these circumstances into consideration, and presented a 48-hour ultimatum to the Bolivian Government, at the expiration of which it took possession, militarily, of all the Bolivian coast and from this moment Bolivia became an inland country, and has remained so to this day.

This was the manner by which Chile advanced five geographical degrees above her northern boundary and attained her goal, which was that her new frontiers should reach those of Peru;



precisely at the beginning of the Peruvian department of Tarapaca, where the important and valuable deposits of nitrate and guano were situated.

The bitter experience of territorial usurpations suffered by Bolivia since the existence of nitrate and guano had been discovered on her soil, had made both this country and Peru consider the advisability of concluding a defensive alliance, and defensive only, which was formally subscribed to in the treaty of 1873. This treaty was likewise to have comprised Argentina, herself a victim, at the time, of Chilian aggression, as were Peru and Bolivia; but difficulties of no real importance and, principally, a want of efficacious diplomatic action in the treatment of the matter, were responsible for the treaty being approved by only one of the Chambers, remaining indefinitely awaiting the approval of the other until 1878, when Chile made a naval demonstration against Argentina, which resulted in the settlement of their difficulty, leaving Chile free, and perfectly prepared, to attack her northern neighbor. The treaty of 1873 had been discussed in the legislative chambers of three republics, and the wide-awake Chilian diplomacy was perfectly cognizant of its terms; in 1876 Carlos Walker Martinez had referred to it in a work published by him (see Question of the Pacific, page 44. Maúrtua). Besides, the Peruvian Government had declared beforehand, on the 19th of November, 1872, that it would give its assistance towards preventing any aggression or pretensions which might be considered unjust or dangerous to Bolivian independence. The treaty, therefore, signed by Peru and Bolivia only, was, notwithstanding, officially considered as a secret compact, in accordance with the pernicious conventionality of Latin-American diplomacy; and from this circumstance Chile was enabled to obtain an excuse to involve Peru in her question with Bolivia, and to include her in the declaration of war which she hurriedly launched against the latter.

In the face of the sudden aggression by Chile, Bolivia turned to Peru for assistance, invoking the treaty of alliance; and Peru, which did not wish to be drawn into the conflict, for which it was unprepared, sent a special mission to Chile, for the purpose of mediating in the dispute and avoiding war. The Peruvian commissioner was badly received, and his residence stoned in Valparaiso; and when, being determined to overlook these somewhat extraordinary manifestations, he arrived in Santiago and was granted his first official reception, he was at once convinced that war with Peru had been decided in advance. The proposals for mediation were rejected; the commissioner was reproached for the secrecy of the treaty of alliance, and a declaration of neu-

trality was peremptorily demanded from him; failing which, Chile declared war on the 5th of April, 1879. From that moment the war practically ceased to include Bolivia, since Chile directed it exclusively against Peru.

Notwithstanding a stubborn resistance, cleverly organized by the diminutive Peruvian fleet, Chile practically became master of the sea, after a campaign which lasted six months, and was thus able to isolate the small Peruvian army in the Department of Tarapaca, which, although it obtained a notable victory in the village of that same name, was obliged to leave in Chilean hands the coveted prize, the Peruvian nitrate and guano deposits, together with all else that the Department contained. A second campaign on land, which ended with the Battle of Tacna, in which Bolivian forces were engaged, and the assault of Arica, gave Chile possession of the provinces bearing these names, which have since become so celebrated; therefore to all appearances the war was now over, as no object could be seen for a further Chilean advance to the north, nor was it possible to eject their forces from the conquered territory. But Balmaceda, a notable Chilean statesman, who later became President of that Republic, had said that on the South American Pacific Coast there were only two centers of progress and action—Lima and Callao, and Santiago and Valparaiso—and that it was necessary that one of these centers should decline so that the other could rise. "We," added the brutal and cynical statesman, "require Tarapacá as a source of income, and Arica as our furthest point on the coast. This is the reason why the Chilean people must have Arica and Tarapaca." These sentiments took root and thrived among the statesmen, the press and the people of Chile, as would a seed in a well-prepared and fertile soil.

The invasion was therefore carried on to the Peruvian capital, in the neighborhood of which two bloody battles were fought, the prosperous towns in the path of the invader being sacked and burned. Lima and Callao escaped this fate due solely to the determined intervention of the European fleets which were in Callao harbor. Hostilities were later carried into the interior and were distinguished everywhere by the most cruel ferocity and unnecessary barbarity; to such an extent, that the horrors committed in Europe by the Germans are insignificant in comparison with the excesses committed by the Chilean army, which were approved by Chilean statesmen and encouraged and applauded by the Chilean press.

The United States Minister in Lima, referring to the atrocities committed by the Chilian soldiers after the taking of the cities of Arica and Tacna, informed his Government that "The Chilian soldiery murdered the greater part of the wounded found on the field of battle and all the officers who were found dead were stripped, robbed and left naked."

Mr. Nugent, Consular Agent of the United States at Arica, said, "I must say that the conduct of the Chilians, both in Tacna and in Arica, has been most disgraceful. In Tacna the greater part of the houses have been sacked and many of them destroyed. Assassinations occur daily. In Arica the wounded and defenceless were butchered. The greater part of the city has been sacked and burned."

The French Consular Agent in his report says: "After Arica had been taken and all resistance was at an end, the Chilian troops, ostensibly under orders from their officers, came to the house where our Consular Agent has his office, and seized a group of 59 men which had taken refuge there, conducted them to the public square and deliberately shot them all."

Before the invasion of Lima had taken place and while it was being prepared, the Chilian Government organized an expedition, undertaken by its fleet, with light landing parties, which visited all the flourishing valleys of the unprotected coast. This expedition has been described by a Chilian statesman and historian in these words:

"The Chilians sent an expedition to carry a firebrand of incendiarism, destruction and desolation; of provocation to implacable warfare and undying hate along the Peruvian Coast. This crusade of violence and of destruction is known as Lynch's Expedition. Its object was to lay waste the rich valleys and establishments in the north of Peru. It is impossible to conceive a more senseless undertaking, leaving out of consideration its barbarity. Although it was apparently directed against Peru, it was in reality more injurious to us. We were living once more in an era of piracy which the whole world, by common accord, had long decided should end; and the facts have proved the truth of this to the complete justification of the protest which the author of this history made at the time, in his character as Senator, against such abuses. One of the greatest dangers lies in the employment of our soldiers in such an undertaking, which does not improve their moral sense, nor our reputation as a civilized people." "Another is that these exploits must inevitably alienate from us the sympathy of foreign states when the knowledge thereof reaches

them." "* * * These northern valleys in Peru produced more than 80,000 tons of sugar in 1879. The Lynch Expedition destroyed this industry between September 5th and November 10th of 1880. After the work of destruction was completed in Payta, the same odious scenes of destruction were repeated at many other points, in the valleys of the coast and in the ports."

To return to the campaign against Lima we will allow persons, whose veracity cannot be impugned, to speak of the unbelievable series of outrages which preceded and followed the fall of the capital of Peru.

Sir Clements R. Markham in his work, "The War Between Peru and Chile," says, "The Chilians gave no quarter. They bayoneted not only the wounded but also the unarmed civilians in Chorrillos, including the venerable British physician, Dr. MacLean, who was infamously murdered. The town was burned amid dreadful scenes of carnage and rapine; Miraflores was given over to the flames and all the country seats in the vicinity were sacked and burned."

"During the occupation of Lima, the Chilians used the university as a barracks, destroying and throwing out the archives. The Public Library, which contained 50,000 printed volumes and 8,000 manuscripts of incalculable value, was likewise turned into a barracks and the volumes sold as so much waste paper or thrown away. The oil paintings and everything of value in the Exhibition building; the contents of the Laboratory and the instruments of the School of Medicine; all the models and scientific instruments in the Schools of Arts, of Sciences and of Commerce; the public monuments, were all either destroyed or shipped to Chile. The seats in the Lecture Halls were cut up to make cases for the shipment of the booty."

In addition to the material ruin of the country, Chile endeavored to obtain its moral and political downfall, once it took possession of the city, by encouraging anarchy and the disregard for the constituted form of government of Pierola, superseding it by that which Garcia Calderon formed, with the sanction of the Chilean Government; but which was later, and with no apparent notice, displaced, to be reorganized, as was the Judicature, with Chilean officials, measures the immediate object of which was to compel Peru to agree to the cession of Tarapacá, Tacna and Arica, as well as to prevent it from ever being in a position to withstand future aggression from Chile; while the ulterior object was the permanent occupation of all Peruvian territory in

case the course of events should make such a phenomenal enterprise feasible.

With regard to this pretension, the Chilean Minister Vergara, in the Chamber of Deputies, on the 6th of August, said, " * * * To celebrate peace at the present time would be equivalent to allowing Peru, within a more or less immediate period, to recuperate its power; therefore the policy adopted by the Government is the wisest: to prolong the occupation indefinitely until Peru shall have been reduced to a state of complete and irreparable decadence." And Errazuriz, the Chilean member of the Lower House, on the 9th of August said: " * * * We should establish a more complete hold on Peru, obtain from it all possible advantages, and weaken it to the last degree until we obtain all that we require." "The Mint is still standing, undamaged, in Lima; the railway from Mollendo to Arequipa has not been destroyed. It is of importance that Peru be devastated without further delay; let the rails be taken up, they may be used by the railway in Pozo Almonte and Agua Santa, or between Parral and Cauquenes * * *" "If we lose our hold on Lima, we lose the income from the Callao Customs House as well as that derived from the northern ports of Peru, the war levies, the guano from Lobos and Chinchu, and the alliance which is now dead will live again." "Neither Garcia Calderon nor Pierola nor Montero nor any other government will ever sign a peace treaty such as we desire."

"On the other hand the war has given an incentive to new industries which will prevent our citizens from stifling within our narrow frontiers. The occupation is showing substantial returns and produces satisfactory balances. Now is the time to obtain all advantages from Peru and to enjoy the booty which victory brings. The Peruvian Customs Houses are inexhaustible sources of profit, and represent an income of five or six million dollars for our country. We need not appeal to Peruvian tribunals for the administration of justice, we are the ones to administer it."

The communications from General Hurlbut, Special Commissioner from the United States, to Secretary of State Blaine, prove that the sentiments and aims of Vergara and Errazuriz were those of the Government and people of Chile, and that both were fulfilled to the limit. It is impossible to include the whole of these communications here, nor others of undisputed authority, but the interest of the following paragraphs, from one of General Hurlbut's notes, is above all considerations:

"There is a very decided tone of arrogance, both in the press

of Chile and among their officers, born I think of their singular success in this war, which may easily become offensive." (Senate Documents Vol. 14, 1881-82, page 528). "The mask which the Chilean Government has worn to cover the real purpose of this war, is now removed, and it is openly avowed that peace will not be permitted, except on condition of cession of territory."

"In looking back upon the whole history of events, prior to hostilities and since, I can have no doubt, but that the purpose, end, and aim of this war, declared by Chile against Peru and Bolivia, was in the beginning and is now the forcible acquisition of the nitrate and guano territory, both of Bolivia and Peru."

Chile at last became convinced that she lacked the means to dominate the whole of Peru in any permanent manner, and that such a bold undertaking held many dangers; Peru, likewise, deprived of every internal means of offence, and of all hope of obtaining it from outside, understood that it was necessary to secure its liberation at any cost. These conclusions led to the formation of a Peruvian Government to which Chile did not deny recognition, as it had not denied it to those which had been organized previously; and with this last it celebrated the treaty of Ancon, which is dated October, 1883.

By this treaty, besides other advantages, Chile retained definite possession of the Peruvian Department of Tarapaca, with its immense wealth in nitrate and guano; and temporary possession of the provinces of Tacna and Arica, whose ultimate fate was to be decided, after a lapse of ten years, by means of a plebiscite, on condition that the State in whose possession they were definitely to remain, should pay the other ten million "soles," Peruvian money. A special protocol, which was to be considered an integral part of the peace treaty, was to prescribe the form in which the plebiscite would be carried out, the terms, and the time for the payment of the ten million "soles."

Estimates founded on data which cannot be appreciably far from the truth, prove that the wealth which the department of Tarapaca contained, when it was taken from Peru, was not less than \$2,135,000,000 which, with at least \$75,000,000 from other sources and \$650,000,000, the value of that which was taken from Bolivia on this occasion alone, make a total of \$3,000,000,000, whereas all that Chile expended on the war scarcely totals 30,000,000 Chilean dollars (silver currency); its budget, when it declared war, amounting to twelve million of the same currency.

It might appear that this colossal wealth and the territory which contained it, with its seas and harbors, would have been

sufficient to satisfy even the most fantastic dreams of aggrandizement. But Tarapacá, which begins in the south in the desert, likewise ends in a desert at the north, and thus remains separated from the rest of Peru by an unsurmountable barrier. This fact made the possibility of future complications with Peru more difficult, and, so as to overcome it, it was important for Chile to advance beyond the desert and intrench herself in the neighboring provinces of Tacna and Arica; and, as a surer means of achieving her purpose, to insert the clause referring to the ten-year tenancy in the treaty, the plebiscite and the ten million forfeit; all of which exactly recalls the first frontier treaty with Bolivia, by which this country lost all its portion of the desert, all its coast and was left immured within its mountains.

The comparison is opportune. When Chile evacuated Peruvian territory, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of Ancon, it retained, in addition to Tacna and Arica, the province of Tarata, to the north of Tacna; and heedless of the protest which the Peruvian Government at once presented, gave as its only reason for this action that the Chilean Government considered that the River Sama, which clause 3 of the treaty mentions, is really the River Chapaya, which is much further north, and thus includes the province of Tarata, which has, to this day, remained in the possession of Chile.

Meanwhile the ten-year period for the celebration of the Plebiscite had arrived and it had been impossible to conclude the protocol which was to determine its conditions; and when the Peruvian Government endeavored to open negotiations tending towards that purpose, dissensions at once arose, for Chile insisted on conditions which would have resulted in a victory at the polls, since its purpose could not be assured in any other manner; for it has not been able, after forty years' martyrdom, to break the patriotic spirit of the captive provinces, notwithstanding the periodical drastic measures of coercion, instituted by the Chilean Government whenever it despaired of the solution, by Time alone, of the problem or the efficacy of the regular means for the nationalization of the territories, or when it feared that some unforeseen event might remove the weight of the iron hand which has lain on them so long.

The end of the European war produced the greatest of all these crises. The triumph, unexpected by Chile, of the Allied cause over the power of Might and Conquest, established and venerated by Chile, at once found an echo in Tacna and Arica, where the full rigor of Chile's severity was flung in an attempt

to arrive at a definite solution of the problem before the recognition of international justice should have become an established fact in the world. But it was too late; and all the efforts of Chilean diplomacy and the press to ascribe to Peru the responsibility for the crimes recently committed against Peruvians and their Consular representatives, in the territories provisionally occupied by Chile, have been shattered when confronted by the incredulity or the irony of public opinion in the United States, as well as that of the honorable men who, fortunately, hold in their hands the destinies of all the countries of the world, but especially of America; all of which proves once more the truth of Lincoln's aphorism, which evidently Chile did not believe: "You may fool some of the people all of the time; you may fool all of the people some of the time, but you can't fool all of the people all of the time."

For once the word of Chile, the conqueror, has not been believed, and although the Chilean Government continues to mistreat and expel the inhabitants of Tacna and Arica from their native land, yet the horrors of another war, which was on the point of being launched against Peru, have not taken place, and the question of the captive provinces remains, and shall remain, "in statu quo" until the matter is settled according to the dictates of justice.

This is, in brief, the celebrated question of Tacna and Arica. But it would be futile to imagine that its settlement will end the differences between Chile and Peru. Tacna and Arica are merely an episode in the long and terrible drama of covetousness and intrigue, of jealousy and undying hate, which has been going on in the Pacific since the independence of both Republics was effected, and perhaps dates back even three hundred years before then, when "the men from Chile" attacked and did to death Francisco Pizarro in his palace in Lima.

Chile's whole international policy, during the entire period of its existence, even in those times when, on account of considerations of exceptional importance, Peru has been its ally, has ever been directed towards promoting disorder in Peru, to stirring up against it the base jealousies and ill-considered ambitions of its neighbors; to breaking up the harmony of such relations which Peru might enter into with these, and to hinder or nullify, by every means in its power, all efforts towards progress or defence.

The surprising circumstance is that the statesmen of Peru and those of other republics, fated to experience the same treat-

ment at the hands of Chile, should not have taken measures of protection against the encroachments of Chilian policy, nor have seen that Chile is the common enemy, the sworn opponent to the realization of American fraternal union, of Arbitration, of Pan-American congresses or of like institutions, to which it only consents when confronted by the absolute impossibility of doing otherwise; ever on the alert to seize every opportunity to thwart and discredit them when feasible. It must be remembered that Chile's idea is, for the present, to conquer all the countries between the Tropics on the West Coast of South America, and it would be indulging in a very short-sighted policy for these countries to imagine that, if Chile were able to absorb Peru and reach *their* frontiers, they might still rely on a continuance of its friendship for them, or even be admitted to a share of the Peruvian spoils. It would appear as though the most elementary feelings of self-preservation had disappeared in those countries! In Peru, even that which is called Chance, but which is merely the manifestation of existing, but occult or unknown causes, was contrary in the most persistent and decided manner during the most anguishing moments of the struggle with Chile.

The Argentine Republic, whose boundary questions with Chile kept her for years the natural ally of Peru, finally concluded a peaceful agreement at the moment when the Chilian warships had set sail for the Magellan Straits, for an encounter with the Argentine vessels, thus releasing the former's ships, which returned to Peru and Bolivia, well prepared for the battle and free from all thoughts of aggression from the South.

The good and noble-minded President Garfield, who, together with the eminent Blaine, his Secretary of State, was determined to oppose the dismemberment of Peru, died under the hand of an assassin when his purpose was about to be realized; General Hurlbut, the special envoy of President Garfield in Lima, and the zealous executor of his instructions to oppose the conquest of Peruvian territory, died suddenly at the very moment when his action was most indispensable, as did Mr. Kilpatrick, his colleague in Santiago; Vice President Arthur, who completed Garfield's term, decided upon a contrary policy; Blaine, who appeared sure of his election for the next term and who would have continued Garfield's policy at the appropriate moment, was defeated, to the general astonishment; and Cleveland, the successful candidate, although a Democrat, remained as indifferent to the conquest of Peru as Arthur, his predecessor, had been. And later, when it was no longer a question of preventing the con-

quest of Tarapacá, but to determine upon the status of Tacna and Arica, President McKinley, who had promoted the assembling of the Pan-American Congress to decide, among other matters, the referring to arbitration of all questions arising between American countries, is likewise assassinated, and is succeeded by the late President Roosevelt, who never was a partisan of arbitration. All these facts powerfully aided Chile and effectively prevented the action of the European Powers in favor of Peru.

But the pendulum swings both ways and it would now appear that the oscillations between Conquest and Justice are decidedly inclined towards the latter. It is to be hoped that, for the honor of America and as an example to the world, the solution of the question between Peru and Chile shall be the first to inaugurate the cycle of reform.

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